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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/appellee, : 
v. : 
CLARENCE J. FRANKLIN : Case No. 960161-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from his conviction of aggravated assault, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(1995) . This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Did the trial court correctly conclude that the elements of 
aggravated assault and threatening with or using a dangerous 
weapon are different and not wholly duplicative? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This issue involves the trial court's legal conclusions, 
which are reviewed for correctness and afforded no deference. 
State v. Vocrt. 824 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1995); 
76-5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995): 
76-5-103. Aggravated Assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1995): 
76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in 
fight or quarrel. 
Every person, except those persons described in Section 
76-10-503, who, not in necessary self-defense in the 
presence of two or more persons, draws or exhibits any 
dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening manner or 
unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In a February 9, 1995 information, the State charged 
defendant, Clarence J. Franklin, with aggravated assault, a third 
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degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995) 
(R. 06). After a trial on October 17 and 18, 1995, a jury 
convicted defendant of the charged offense (R. 106) . On March 4, 
1996, the trial court sentenced defendant to zerc-to-five years 
in prison and a $5,000.00 fine (R. 118). The trial court stayed 
the sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years 
with the provision that defendant spend one year in jail and pay 
full restitution and a fine of $1,000.00 (R. 118). Defendant 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal on March 11, 1996 (R. 120). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The jury convicted defendant of aggravated assault for 
pointing a gun at the victim's chest, from about four feet away, 
and threatening to kill him. The following details are recited 
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. 
Gordon. 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996); State v. Winward. 907 P.2d 
1188, 1189 (Utah App. 1995). 
On February 7, 1995, at about 9:00 p.m., David Golder and 
Joshua Nielson exited the Fashion Place Mall to see a stranger 
rummaging through Golder's 1987 Jeep, which was parked 
approximately 70 feet from the mall entrance (R. 228-29, 242, 
245). Golder shouted at the stranger and asked him what he was 
doing in the Jeep (R. 230, 245-46). The stranger, who was 
3 
accompanied by another person unknown to Golder, responded by 
exclaiming, uWe didn't steal it. We didn't steal it. The guys 
in the blue truck did." (R. 230, 264). Golder looked in his Jeep 
to discover that his stereo, portable CD player, and some CDs 
were gone (R. 231, 264). 
Golder accused the strangers of stealing the missing items, 
but they persisted that they had not, blaming the theft on "some 
kid in a blue Mazda truck." (R. 264-65, 230). The strangers then 
invited Golder and Nielson to look through their own car for the 
stolen items (R. 231, 264-65). 
Golder and Nielson had just begun to look in the windows of 
the other car, when a blue Mitsubishi pick-up truck driven by 
Justin Sparacino pulled up (R. 232-233, 265, 295, 311). 
Defendant sat in the passenger seat with the window down (233, 
234, 235, 278, 266, 311). Golder approached the passenger side 
of the truck and began demanding his "stuff" back (R. 234, 266, 
315) . 
As Golder approached, defendant pointed a large gun at 
Golder and said "Fuck you, mother fucker. You ain't shit. I 
will kill you right now." (R. 236-37, 267-68). Because Golder 
initially thought the gun was a toy, he kept advancing (R. 237). 
As Golder neared, however, he realized that the gun was real (R. 
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237). Defendant next pointed the gun at Nielson, who had run up 
behind Golder, and repeated, "I will kill you. You ain't shit, 
mother fucker." (R. 267). 
As Golder came closer, defendant opened the door, stepped 
out and pointed the gun directly at Golder's chest, which was 
only one to four feet away (R. 256, 269, 278-79). Defendant then 
retreated into the truck, which raced off (R. 269, 303). Golder 
and Nielson took down the truck's license plate and immediately 
drove to the police station to report the incident (R. 260, 
269) . 
Meanwhile, Sparacino and defendant returned to Sparacino's 
home where they parked the truck and left with a friend (R. 3 04-
05, 318). They returned to find police speaking with Sparacino's 
mother, the owner of the truck (R. 305, 319, 334). Sparacino 
walked up and said, "How is it going, Mrs. Sparacino?" (R. 335). 
One of the officers recognized Sparacino from a photograph that 
Mrs. Sparacino had showed him (R. 335). The officer kidded 
Sparacino about his statement and Sparacino finally admitted who 
he was (R. 335). Officers interviewed Sparacino and defendant 
separately (R. 335-37, 341). Sparacino admitted to having been 
in the truck that night, but denied having driven to Fashion 
Place Mall (R. 336) . Defendant, on the other hand, denied that 
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he had even been in the blue truck that evening or that he had 
been to the mall (R. 337). Both Sparacino and defendant changed 
their stories at trial and testified that they had driven to the 
Fashion Place Mall in the blue truck that night, but denied that 
defendant had pointed a gun at Golder or threatened him (R. 303-
06, 318) . 
At trial, after the State rested its case-in-chief, 
defendant moved to reduce the charge from aggravated assault to 
threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or 
quarrel on the ground that the two crimes proscribed the same 
conduct but carried different penalties (R. 285-86). The court 
denied defendant's motion, concluding that the elements of the 
two crimes were not identical (R. 291). The court did determine, 
however, that under the facts presented, defendant was entitled 
to have a jury instruction on using a dangerous weapon in a fight 
or quarrel as a lesser included offense (R. 292). Despite the 
lesser included offense instruction, the jury convicted defendant 
of aggravated assault (R. 89-93, 106), 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Defendant is not entitled to a reduction of his penalty 
under State v. Shondel. 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), because the 
elements of aggravated assault and threatening with a dangerous 
6 
weapon are not identical. Specifically, aggravated assault 
requires the making of a threat to do bodily harm, whereas 
threatening with a weapon does not. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE CRIMES OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND THREATENING 
WITH OR USING A DANGEROUS WEAPON IN FIGHT OR 
QUARREL DO NOT SHARE IDENTICAL ELEMENTS. 
THEREFORE, STATE V, SHONDEL DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS 
CASE. 
Relying on State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), 
defendant argues that the trial court erred in not reducing his 
conviction for third degree felony aggravated assault to 
threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or 
quarrel, a class A misdemeanor. Defendant bases his argument on 
the assertion that the elements of aggravated assault as charged 
in this case are the same as those of threatening with a 
dangerous weapon. 
Under Shondel and its progeny, if two statutes proscribe the 
same crime but assess different penalties, the defendant is 
entitled to receive the lesser penalty. Shondelr 453 P.2d at 
147; see alSQ State V, Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985); 
State V, QQmZ, 722 P.2d 747, 749-50 (Utah 1986); State v. Clark. 
632 P.2d 841, 843-44 (Utah 1981); State v. Verdin. 595 P.2d 862, 
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862 (Utah 1979); see also State v. Vogt. 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah 
App. 1991) . Otherwise, the exact same conduct would be ''subject 
to different penalties depending upon which of two statutory 
sections a prosecutor chooses to charge." Bryan. 709 P.2d at 
263. That would violate a defendant's right to equal protection 
under the laws. Id. at 263; see Clark. 632 P.2d at 843-44. 
The test for determining whether two statutes proscribe the 
same conduct is whether the "two statutes are wholly duplicative 
as to the elements of the crime." Bryan. 709 P.2d at 263. If 
the elements of the crimes are not identical and the two statutes 
require "some proof of some fact or element not required to 
establish the other," they do not proscribe the same conduct and 
the defendant may be charged with the crime carrying the more 
severe penalty. Clark. 632 P.2d at 844. 
In this case, the trial court properly refused to 
reduce the charges against defendant because the crimes of 
aggravated assault and threatening with a dangerous weapon do not 
share identical elements. The Utah Code defines aggravated 
assault as follows: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or 
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(b) under circumstances not amounting to a 
violation of Subsection 1(a), uses a dangerous weapon 
as defined in Section 7S-1-6Q1 or another means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a second 
degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1)(b) is a third degree 
felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995) (emphasis added). Defendant was 
charged under subsection (1)(b), therefore, to be guilty of 
aggravated assault, defendant had to commit an assault by using a 
dangerous weapon. Assault is 
(a) an attempt with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat. accompanied by show of immediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another: or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, 
that causes or creates a substantial risk or bodily 
injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (1995) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
elements the State needed to prove for aggravated assault in this 
case were that 1) defendant made a threat to do bodily injury to 
another, 2) the threat was accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, and 3) the defendant used a dangerous weapon. 
In contrast, threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in 
a fight or quarrel is defined as 
Every person . . . who not in necessary self-
defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws 
or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry or 
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threatening manner or unlawfully uses the same in any 
fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1995). Thus, to be guilty of 
threatening with a dangerous weapon, the defendant must 1) draw 
or exhibit a dangerous weapon 2) in an angry or threatening way 
or manner 3) in the presence of two or more persons 4) not in 
necessary self-defense, or the defendant must unlawfully use a 
dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel. Since defendant did not 
actually use, but merely pointed, the gun, only the first four 
elements are at issue in this case. 
Ignoring controlling precedent, defendant asserts that 
making a threat to do bodily injury with a dangerous weapon is 
the same as showing a dangerous weapon in an angry or threatening 
manner. The Utah Supreme Court, however, has recognized that 
there is a qualitative difference between intentionally making a 
threat to harm someone with a gun and merely exhibiting a 
dangerous weapon in a threatening manner. State v. Verdin. 595 
P.2d at 862. The defendant in Verdin was convicted of aggravated 
assault. Like the defendant in this case, Verdin argued that the 
elements of aggravated assault were the same as those of 
threatening with a dangerous weapon and that he was entitled to 
the lesser penalty. Id. The Court summarily rejected that 
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argument, observing that the "distinctions in levels of 
proscribed conduct are clear and easily to be comprehended." Id. 
The Court pointed out that the evidence in that case established 
all the elements of aggravated assault/ i.e., that 
Verdin aimed a deadly1 weapon, a loaded rifle, at a 
police officer, worked the action to put a shell into 
the firing chamber, and attempted to pull the trigger 
while declaring his intention to "smoke" the officer. 
This is quite a different and more reprehensible course 
of action than exhibiting a dangerous weapon in a 
threatening manner. 
Id. at 863 (emphasis added, except for the word "deadly" which 
was emphasized in the original). 
The differences between the two crimes was also acknowledged 
in State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah 1984). In that 
case, the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant, who was 
charged with aggravated assault, was entitled to a lesser 
included offense instruction of threatening with a dangerous 
weapon. Id. The Court pointed out that to prove defendant 
committed aggravated assault, the State had to show that 
defendant assaulted the officer with a deadly weapon "with the 
*At the time Verdin was decided aggravated assault required 
the use of a "deadly" weapon as opposed to a "dangerous" weapon 
required in the current version of the statute. Any distinction 
between a "deadly" and a "dangerous" weapon is insignificant for 
purposes of this case and did not form the basis for the Court's 
decision in Verdin. See Verdin, 595 P.2d at 862-63. 
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intention to do bodily harm." Id. Threatening with a dangerous 
weapon, on the hand, required only the exhibiting of a dangerous 
weapon in an angry or threatening manner. Id. The Court 
concluded that because there was evidence that "clearly negated a 
threat by defendant to do bodily harm" the jury could have 
acquitted defendant of aggravated assault and convicted him of 
the lesser offense of threatening with a weapon. Id. at 555. 
Implicit in that ruling is the recognition that aggravated 
assault requires a threat to do bodily harm, while threatening 
with a dangerous weapon does not. 
In sum, threatening with a dangerous weapon does not require 
a defendant to make a threat to do bodily injury to another. 
Rather, the defendant need only display a dangerous weapon in a 
way that is angry or threatening. Thus, the defendant may be 
guilty of threatening with a weapon even though there is no 
threat made or intended. Aggravated assault, on the other hand, 
requires that a threat of bodily injury be made. As the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized, there is a real difference between 
waving or merely exhibiting a gun in an angry or threatening way 
and intentionally pointing a gun and uttering a threat to do 
bodily injury. Verdin. 595 P.2d at 863; Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 
554-555. 
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In this case, defendant expressly threatened to kill Golder 
and Nielson and backed up his threat by pointing a gun at them 
(R. 236-37; 267-68). While, it is arguable under these facts 
that defendant could have been found guilty of threatening Golder 
with a dangerous weapon in that he exhibited the gun in a 
threatening manner, defendant also did something not required by 
the threatening with a dangerous weapon statute: he 
intentionally threatened Golder and Nielson with bodily injury. 
That crucial element of aggravated assault is what distinguishes 
the crime of aggravated assault from the crime of threatening 
with a dangerous weapon. 
Because the elements of aggravated assault and threatening 
with a weapon are not identical, they do not proscribe the same 
conduct and Shondel does not apply to this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly concluded that the elements of 
aggravated assault differed significantly from the elements of 
threatening with a dangerous weapon and properly refused to 
reduce defendant's charges. The State therefore respectfully 
requests the Court to affirm defendant's conviction of aggravated 
assault. 
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